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 A bright metallic thread of future-oriented thinking runs through the tapestry of 
the philosophy of mind, especially in those parts of the ﬁ eld that have grappled 
with the possibility of minds as machines. Can a robot feel pain? Can a suitably 
programmed computer think actual thoughts? Could humans survive the total 
replacement of their nervous system by neural prosthetics? As the pace of techno-
logical change quickens, what was once purely speculative is becoming more and 
more real. As society moves further into the 21st century, what are the ways that 
philosophy of mind can shape the future? What challenges will the future bring 
to the discipline? In this chapter, we examine a few suggestive possibilities. We 
begin with what we suspect will be a game changer – the development of AI and 
artiﬁ cial general intelligence (AGI). We then turn to radical brain enhancements, 
urging that the future will likely introduce exciting new issues involving (inter 
alia) the extended mind hypothesis, the epistemology of evaluating the thoughts 
of vastly smarter beings, mind uploading, and more. 
 1. The rise of the machines: some philosophical challenges 
 These last few years have been marked by the widespread cultural recognition 
that sophisticated AI is under development, and may change the face of society. 
For instance, according to a recent survey, the most cited AI researchers expect 
AI to “carry out most human professions at least as well as a typical human” 
within a 10-percent probability by the year 2024. Further, they assign a 50-percent 
probability by 2050, and a 90-percent probability by 2070 ( Muller and Bostrom 
2014 ). 1 AI critics, such as John Searle, Jerry Fodor and Hubert Dreyfus, must now 
answer to the impressive work coming out of venues like Google’s  DeepMind and 
exhibited by IBM’s  Watson program, 2 rather than referring back to the notorious 
litany of failures of AI in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Indeed, silicon seems to be a better medium for information processing than the 
brain. Neurons reach a peak speed of about 200 Hz, which is about seven orders 
of magnitude slower than current microprocessors ( Bostrom 2014 , 59). Although 
the brain compensates for some of this with massive parallelism, features such 
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as “hubs,” and so on, crucial mental capacities such as attention rely upon serial 
processing, which is incredibly slow, and has a maximum capacity of about seven 
manageable chunks (Miller 1956;  Schneider 2014 ). Additionally, the number of 
neurons in a human brain is limited by cranial volume and metabolism, but com-
puters can occupy entire buildings or cities, and can even be remotely connected 
across the globe ( Bostrom 2014 ;  Schneider 2014 ). 
 Of course, the human brain is more intelligent than any modern day computer. 
Intelligent machines can in principle be constructed by reverse engineering the brain, 
however, and improving upon its algorithms, or through some combination of reverse 
engineering and judicious algorithms that aren’t based on the workings of the human 
brain. In addition, an AI program can be downloaded to different locations at once, 
is easily modiﬁ able, and can survive under a variety of conditions that carbon-based 
life cannot. The increases in redundancy and backups that programs allow mean that 
AI minds will be hardier and more reliable than their biological counterparts. 
 We’ve noted AI experts’ projections that sophisticated AI may be reached within 
the next several decades. By “sophisticated AI” what is meant is  artiﬁ cial gen-
eral intelligence (AGI). An AGI is a ﬂ exible, domain-general intelligence – an 
intelligence that can integrate material from various domains, rather than merely 
excelling at a single task, like winning  Jeopardy or playing chess. Philosophers 
have debated the possibility of AGI for decades, and we hope they will help shape 
the global understanding of AGI in the future. For instance, perhaps some philoso-
phers will discover a distinctively philosophical reason for believing that, despite 
the successes of Watson and  DeepMind , experts will (and must) hit a wall when it 
comes to creating AGI – perhaps computers can excel at domain speciﬁ c reason-
ing but general purpose reasoning is not amenable to computational explanation. 
Or perhaps the resources of the philosophy of mind will not unearth a deep obsta-
cle to AGI, but instead provide insights that will aid in its development. 
 In any case, within society at large, the earlier skepticism about AGI has given 
way. Indeed, there is now a general suspicion that once AGI is reached, it may 
upgrade itself to even greater levels of intelligence. As David Chalmers explains: 
 The key idea is that a machine that is more intelligent than humans will 
be better than humans at designing machines. So it will be capable of 
designing a machine more intelligent than the most intelligent machine 
that humans can design. So if it is itself designed by humans, it will be 
capable of designing a machine more intelligent than itself. By similar 
reasoning, this next machine will also be capable of designing a machine 
more intelligent than itself. If every machine in turn does what it is capa-
ble of, we should expect a sequence of ever more intelligent machines. 
 ( Chalmers 2010 ) 
 In a similar vein, Nick Bostrom’s  New York Times bestselling book  Superintelli-
gence: Paths, Dangers and Strategies ( 2014 ) argues that a superintelligence could 
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supplant humans as the dominant intelligence on the planet, and that the sequence 
of changes could be rapid-ﬁ re (see also Kurzweil 2005). Indeed, due in large 
part to Bostrom’s book, and the successes at  DeepMind , this last year marked the 
widespread cultural and scientiﬁ c recognition of the possibility of “superintel-
ligent AI.” 3 
 Superintelligent AI : a kind of artiﬁ cial general intelligence that is able 
to exceed the best human level intelligence in every ﬁ eld – social skills, 
general wisdom, scientiﬁ c creativity, and so on 
 ( Bostrom 2014 ; Kurzweil 2005; Schneider 2009a;  2015 ). 
 Superintelligent AI (SAI) could be developed during a  technological singularity , 
a point at which ever more rapid technological advances, especially, an intelli-
gence explosion, reach a point at which unenhanced humans can no longer predict 
or even understand the changes that are unfolding. If an intelligence explosion 
occurs, Bostrom warns that there is no way to predict or control the ﬁ nal goals 
of a SAI. Moral programming is difﬁ cult to specify in a foolproof fashion, and 
it could be rewritten by a superintelligence in any case. Nor is there any agree-
ment in the ﬁ eld of ethics about what the correct moral principles are. Further, 
a clever machine could bypass safeguards like kill switches and attempts to box 
it in, and could potentially be an existential threat to humanity ( Bostrom 2014 ). 
A superintelligence is, after all, deﬁ ned as an entity that is more intelligent than 
humans, in every domain. Bostrom calls this problem “The Control Problem.” 
( Bostrom 2014 ) 
 The control problem is a serious problem – perhaps it is even insurmountable. 
Indeed, upon reading Bostrom’s book, scientists and business leaders such as Ste-
phen Hawking, Bill Gates, Max Tegmark, among others, commented that superin-
telligent AI could threaten the human race, having goals that humans can neither 
predict nor control. Yet most current work on the control problem is being done 
by computer scientists. Philosophers of mind and moral philosophers can add to 
these debates, contributing work on how to create friendly AI (for an excellent 
overview of the issues, see Wallach and Allen 2010). 
 The possibility of human or beyond-human AI raises further philosophi-
cal questions as well. If AGI and SAI are developed, would they be conscious? 
Would they be selves or persons, although they are arguably not even living 
beings? Of course, perhaps we are putting the cart before the horse in assuming 
that superintelligence can even be developed: perhaps the move from human-
level AGI to superintelligence is itself questionable (Chalmers 2010)? After all, 
how can humans create beyond-human intelligence given that our own intellec-
tual resources are only at a human level? Quicker processing speed and a greater 
number of cognitive operations do not necessarily result in a qualitative shift to a 
greater form of intelligence. Indeed, what are markers for “beyond human intel-
ligence”, and how can we determine when it has been reached? 
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 In his groundbreaking paper on the singularity, Chalmers suggests even more 
issues that philosophers could explore: 
 Philosophically: The singularity raises many important philosophical 
questions. . . . The potential consequences of an intelligence explosion 
force us to think hard about values and morality and about consciousness 
and personal identity. In effect, the singularity brings up some of the 
hardest traditional questions in philosophy and raises some new philo-
sophical questions as well. 
 . . . To determine whether an intelligence explosion will be a good or 
a bad thing, we need to think about the relationship between intelligence 
and value. To determine whether we can play a signiﬁ cant role in a post-
singularity world, we need to know whether human identity can survive 
the enhancing of our cognitive systems, perhaps through uploading onto 
new technology. These are life-or-death questions that may confront us 
in coming decades or centuries. To have any hope of answering them, we 
need to think clearly about the philosophical issues. 
 ( Chalmers 2010 ) 
 What sorts of things can philosophers do to help tackle the issues raised by 
AI, the singularity, and other technologies on the horizon? We recommend an 
approach that draws on thought experiments of the sort traditionally considered 
by philosophers of mind, but tempered by knowledge of contemporary advances 
in science and technology. 
 Philosophers often view thought experiments as windows into the funda-
mental nature of things – hypothetical situations in the “laboratory of the mind” 
that depict something that exceeds the bounds of current technology or even is 
incompatible with the laws of nature, but that is supposed to reveal something 
philosophically enlightening about the topic in question (Schneider 2009). 
Thought experiments can entertain, illustrate a puzzle, lay bare a contradic-
tion in thought, and move us toward further clariﬁ cation. Yet experimental phi-
losophers have countered that thought experiments are not trustworthy guides 
to philosophical issues because they covertly rely upon intuitive judgments 
about possibility that are hostage to features like our cultural and economic 
backgrounds. 
 Emerging technologies introduce a host of real world cases – cases that seem 
nomologically and technologically possible – rather than relying upon dubious 
intuitions about what is possible in remote possible worlds like zombie worlds 
(worlds in which no entity is conscious, even the entities that act like they are) or 
Cartesian worlds stocked with disembodied minds. And, in the domain of emerging 
technologies – this arena in which science ﬁ ction meets science fact – philosophy 
quite possibly becomes a matter of life and death, as we will further discuss 
shortly ( Chalmers 2010 ; Schneider 2009;  Mandik 2015 ). 
AuQ7
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 In what follows, we identify more ways that philosophers of mind can help 
shape the 21st century. We begin with a ﬁ ctional scenario that introduces issues 
about the extended mind hypothesis. We then turn to several interrelated philo-
sophical problems, based upon this scenario and others that we introduce. 
 2. The ethics of brain enhancement, the extended mind, 
and human integration into a post-singularity world 
 Consider the following thought experiment, modiﬁ ed from Schneider (2009a): 
 Suppose it is 2025 and being a technophile, you purchase brain enhance-
ments as they become readily available. First, you add a mobile internet 
connection to your retina, then, you enhance your working memory by 
adding neural circuitry. You are now ofﬁ cially a cyborg. Now skip ahead 
to 2040. Through nanotechnological therapies and enhancements you 
are able to extend your lifespan, and as the years progress, you continue 
to accumulate more far-reaching enhancements. By 2060, after several 
small but cumulatively profound alterations, you are a “posthuman.” To 
quote philosopher Nick Bostrom, posthumans are possible future beings, 
“whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as 
to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards.” 
 (Bostrom 2017) 
 At this point, your intelligence is enhanced not just in terms of speed of 
mental processing; you are now able to make rich connections that you 
were not able to make before. Unenhanced humans, or “naturals,” seem 
to you to be intellectually disabled – you have little in common with 
them – but as a transhumanist (a proponent of the sorts of cybernetic and 
genetic modiﬁ cations that, in the extreme case, leads to posthumans), 
you are supportive of their right to not enhance. 
 (Bostrom 2017; Garreau 2004;  Kurzweil 2005 ) 
 It is now 2250 AD. Over time, the slow addition of better and better neu-
ral circuitry has left no real intellectual difference in kind between you 
and AI. Your mental operations have been gradually transferring to the 
cloud, and by this point, you are silicon-based. The only real difference 
between you and an AI creature of standard design is one of origin – 
you were once a natural. But you are now almost entirely engineered by 
technology – you are perhaps more aptly characterized as a member of a 
rather heterogeneous class of AI life forms. 
 Of course, this is just a thought experiment, but it is hard to imagine people 
in mainstream society resisting opportunities for superior health, intelligence, 
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extreme longevity and efﬁ ciency. Indeed, the advanced technologies wing of the 
defense department (DARPA) is now working on brain chips, electronic prosthet-
ics implanted in the brain, providing intriguing examples of “cyborgs.” 
 There are many philosophical issues that this thought experiment raises. Let us 
consider a few. 
 2.1 The extended mind, 2.0 
 Despite being implanted  in brains, brain chips strike us as providing better sup-
port for the extended mind hypothesis than Clark and Chalmers’s original exam-
ples of laptops and notepads. (The extended mind hypothesis is the proposal that 
the physical substrate for the human mind is not restricted to the human central 
nervous system, but can sometimes or perhaps always include external physical 
items, as when one’s memories are stored in external media such as notebooks 
and hard drives. See Chapter 10). For it can be objected that laptops and notepads 
do not seem to exhibit a sufﬁ ciently rich cognitive integration with the brain to 
justify the claim that the mind is extended beyond the brain. Instead, information 
from notebooks and laptops enters into cognitive and perceptual systems through 
sensory transducers. When one forgets their laptop or notebook, they only have 
recourse to the processing of their brain. The brain itself seems to be the true unit 
of mentality. In contrast, brain implants could become well-integrated with the 
biological brain, for the inputs from the implants do not enter the cognitive system 
through sensory transducers, but could in principle function like actual minicol-
umns or brain regions. 
 You might object that it is unclear what’s “extended” about neural prostheses. 
If they aren’t outside of the body, how do they make the mind “extended”? But 
if one believes the mind is just the brain, then this makes the mind extended. 
Further, these implants need not be in the skull, they could be located elsewhere 
in the body, or even on the cloud, for instance. What is crucial is that they are as 
well integrated as components of the brain normally are. Would brain or cloud-
based implants provide better support for the view that the mind is extended? 
Further, can consciousness (as opposed to mere information processing) really 
extend beyond the biological brain? That is, can silicon minicolumns or micro-
chips be part of the neural basis of conscious experience? These are issues well-
worth considering, we believe, as we move to a future with neural enhancements 
and therapies that extend beyond the biological brain. 
 2.2 Human integration into a post-singularity world 
 Let us continue our thought experiments further into the future. Suppose that it 
is now AD 2250 and some humans have upgraded to become superintelligent 
beings, through gradual cognitive enhancements, including cloud-based compu-
tations. But suppose you resist any upgrades – you opt to stay a “Natural” – a 
member of a group resisting enhancements ( Garreau 2004 ). Having conceptual 
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resources beyond your wildest imagination, the superintelligent beings generate 
an entirely new budget of solutions to longstanding, central philosophical prob-
lems, such as the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, and the 
problem of free will. They univocally and passionately tell you that the solutions 
are obvious. But you and the other Naturals throw your hands up; these “solu-
tions” strike you and the other unenhanced as gibberish ( Schneider 2009b ). 
 You think: Who knows, maybe these “superintelligent” beings were engineered 
poorly; or maybe it is me. Perhaps the unenhanced are “cognitively closed,” as 
Colin McGinn has argued, being constitutionally unable to solve major philo-
sophical problems ( McGinn 1993 ). The enhanced call themselves “Humans 2.0”; 
they claim the unenhanced are but an inferior version. They beg you to enhance. 
What shall you do? What shall you make of your epistemic predicament? You 
cannot grasp the contents of the superintelligent beings’ thoughts without signiﬁ -
cant upgrades. But what if their way of thinking is ﬂ awed to begin with? In that 
case, upgrading will surely not help. Is there some sort of neutral vantage point or 
at least a set of plausible principles with which to guide you in framing a response 
to such a challenge? 
 This scenario is merely one example of the kind of issues that will come to 
the fore as machines outsmart humans, and as some humans themselves enhance 
their intelligence in ways that allow them to outthink ordinary humans, at least in 
certain domains. Understanding how to approach such situations requires fruitful 
collaboration between philosophers of mind, epistemologists, AI specialists, and 
others. 
 2.2.1 The ethics of brain enhancement decisions 
 Should we embrace postbiological intelligence? Enhancement decisions will 
require deep deliberation about metaphysical and ethical questions that are both 
controversial and difﬁ cult to solve: questions that require reﬂ ection about per-
sonal identity and the nature of mind, among other issues, and which draw from 
empirical work in cognitive science. As we explain below, enhancing by mov-
ing from carbon to silicon may not be something that preserves your conscious 
experience or personal identity. Given this, a precautionary stance suggests that 
we should not enhance unless it is conﬁ rmed that consciousness is preserved. 
For the enhancement is supposed to increase the quality of your life, enabling 
your survival and giving you more time on the planet as a subject of experience. 
However, in contrast to a precautionary stance is an attitude of “metaphysical 
daring” ( Mandik 2015 ). Being metaphysically daring involves making a kind of 
bet about metaphysical issues such as whether a naturally originating mind could 
have its consciousness or identity preserved across a transformation from tissue 
to silicon chips. Metaphysically daring future humans and posthumans may reap 
the beneﬁ ts of an enhanced substrate. Indeed, as Mandik argues, systems that 
exhibit high degrees of metaphysical daring may, in making many more copies of 
themselves in the form of digital backups, be more ﬁ t in a Darwinian sense than 
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their more cautious evolutionary competitors. Of course, part of what makes the 
attitude  daring is the lack of certainty about whether it is correct that such beneﬁ ts 
are forthcoming ( Mandik 2015 ). 
 Given both the lack of certainty on such matters and their life-or-death nature, a 
pluralistic society should recognize the diversity of different philosophical views 
on these matters, including a wide range from the metaphysically daring to the 
metaphysically cautious, and not assume that science itself can answer ques-
tions about whether radical forms of brain enhancement are justiﬁ able, or are 
even compatible with survival, given different views on personal identity and the 
nature of mind. A good place to further illustrate these observations is with a very 
extreme “enhancement” case that has been in the news a good deal recently: mind 
uploading. 
 3. Mind uploading (“Whole Brain Emulation”) 
 Science ﬁ ction has long depicted scenarios in which a person in distress, such 
as Johnny Depp’s character in  Transcendence , uploads his or her brain in last 
ditch effort to avoid death. The idea behind uploading is that the person’s brain 
is scanned, and a software model of it is constructed that is so precise that, when 
run on ultra-efﬁ cient hardware, it thinks and behaves in exactly the same way as 
the original brain. The process of scanning will likely destroy the original brain, 
as in  Transcendence , although non-destructive uploading has also been discussed 
as a more distant possibility ( Blackford and Broderick 2014 ). Uploading is akin 
to migration to the cloud, but it can be more rapid ﬁ re, bypassing your cyborgiza-
tion. Uploaded beings can be computationally identical to the original human, but 
they could also become vastly smarter, and less like an ordinary human, as with 
 Transcendence . 
 You might think that if uploading could be developed, day-to-day life would 
be drastically improved. For instance, on Monday at 6:00 PM, you could have 
sushi in Tokyo; by 7:30 PM, you could be sipping wine nestled in the hills of 
the Napa Valley; you need only rent a suitable android body in each locale. Air-
ports could become a thing of the past. Bodily harm matters little to you, for 
you just pay a fee to the rental company when your android surrogate is injured 
or destroyed. Formerly averse to risk, you ﬁ nd yourself skydiving and climbing 
Everest. You think: if I continue to backup, I will live forever. What a surprising 
route to immortality. 
 Oxford University’s  Future of Humanity Institute has a brain emulation project 
that is taking the ﬁ rst steps toward developing uploading. The  OpenWorm project 
has successfully uploaded a worm ( C elegans ) and downloaded it to a Lego robot, 
which behaved like a worm. Uploading could be perfected during a technological 
singularity. So suppose, like Will Caster, Johnny Depp’s character in  Transcend-
ence , you have just learned you have only a few weeks to live. You recall Steven 
Hawking’s remark: “I think the brain is like a programme . . . so it’s theoretically 
possible to copy the brain onto a computer and so provide a form of life after 
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death” (Collins 2013). So you wonder: could I truly transfer my consciousness to 
a computer? 
 Metaphysics has now become a matter of life and death for you. Would you sur-
vive? Philosophers, such as Nick Bostrom and David Chalmers, tend to respond 
with guarded optimism. But let’s consider a literary example to see if even guarded 
optimism is well-founded. In Robert Sawyer’s novel  Mindscan the protagonist, 
Jake Sullivan, tries to upload to avoid dying of a brain tumor. He undergoes a 
non-destructive uploading procedure, and although the contents of his brain are 
copied precisely, he wakes up after the procedure, still on the operating table, and 
is astonished to ﬁ nd that he is still stuck in his original body. His consciousness 
did not “transfer”! Sullivan should have read the personal identity literature in 
metaphysics, which asks: in virtue of what do you survive over the time? Having a 
soul? Being a material being? Having the same memories and thought patterns as 
your earlier self? In deciding whether you could survive uploading, it is important 
to consider the metaphysical credentials behind each of these views (Schneider 
2009). (See also  Chapter 5 on personal identity.) 
 One reason Jake should have been suspicious is that objects generally follow 
a continuous trajectory through space over time – but here, for Jake to “trans-
fer” to his upload, his brain would not even move, and his consciousness would 
somehow travel inside a computer and then, at a later point, be downloaded into 
an android. And the stuff that makes up the new Jake would be entirely different. 
Further, an upload can be downloaded to multiple places at once. But, plausibly, at 
most only one of these creatures would really be Jake. Which one? Finally, notice 
that Jake survived the scan. So why believe that any of the uploads is him, rather 
than the original Jake? In the macroscopic world around us, single objects do not 
reside in multiple locations at once. 
 At best, so-called mind uploaders merely create computational copies of them-
selves that are forms of artiﬁ cial intelligence (AI). But a copy is not the same as 
the original. It’s a  copy (Schneider 2014). But if uploads are copies, why be conﬁ -
dent, to go back to our original case of your migration to the cloud, that moving to 
the cloud really preserves your identity? Of course, maybe Derek Parﬁ t is correct. 
Perhaps there is no identity to begin with (Parﬁ t 1984). In this case, survival is not 
an issue for you. You may opt to upload for other reasons though – perhaps you 
believe that creating a psychological duplicate is somehow beneﬁ cial. 
 Or maybe there really is survival, but we are like programs, which can be 
uploaded and downloaded? In this latter case, maybe uploading can preserve 
identity because the mind is a program. A program is abstract, like a musical score 
or equation, and is not a concrete object like a coffee cup, a brain, or a chair. On 
this sort of view, minds, as programs, are abstract in the sense that the plot of a 
novel or a song’s melody is abstract. If an author emails their latest novel to their 
publisher, and the publisher prints thousands of copies of the novel, there’s only 
one story here, not thousands. If human minds are abstract in this sense, then the 
scenario of nond-estructive uploading involves only a single mind, just as there 
can be a thousand bound copies of a single novel ( Mandik 2015 , 146–147). 
AuQ9
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 What case can be made for regarding minds as abstract? As Mandik points out: 
 Much of what we think, want, and experience is abstract. I can think that 
there’s a dog chasing a cat without there being some particular dog or 
particular cat that I am thereby thinking about. As Quine (1956) points 
out, the desire I express in saying “I want a sloop” can just be me want-
ing relief from slooplessness without there being some certain sloop that 
I want. Regarding experiences and “what it is like” to have them: I can 
experience a patch of red on separate occasions, and what it is like to have 
the experience on the one occasion may be exactly like what it is like on 
the other occasion.  Tye (1995 ) characterizes all phenomenal character as 
“abstract” in this sense. If what matters for having my mind is something 
that can be characterized as abstract in these ways, the possibility opens 
of a deep analogy between a human life and the story of a novel. 
 ( Mandik 2015 , 147) 
 The view that the mind is abstract in a way that would allow for continuity through 
uploading is not without its opponents. For instance, Schneider has argued the mind 
is not a program. For a program or algorithm is like an equation and is abstract. In 
the ﬁ elds of philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics, abstract entities are by 
deﬁ nition non-spatial, non-causal, atemporal, unchanging, and non-physical. We 
can tell introspectively that time passes, so minds are temporal, and minds (or more 
speciﬁ cally, mental property tokenings, or mental events) are causal, and, relat-
edly, they experience chance. An equation or algorithm is not located anywhere – 
although inscriptions and program instantiations are. Our minds and thoughts have 
concrete locations in space. At best, the mind is a  program instantiation , which is a 
concrete entity – a physical object ( Schneider, forthcoming ). 
 Regardless of whether we regard the survival conditions of minds as more like 
the survival conditions for ordinary physical objects or instead like abstract enti-
ties such as songs or stories, the important thing is that these are all very contro-
versial positions, relying on certain convictions about the nature of the self, and 
they militate for different decisions about radical brain enhancement. 
 As the 21st century unfolds, enhancement decisions will not merely require 
scientiﬁ c information about whether uploading can be developed, or whether vari-
ous minicolumns in your brain can be replaced with silicon implants. They will 
require philosophical deliberation about the nature of self and mind. 
 We will revisit radical brain enhancement shortly, for we have yet to explore 
the important question of whether a silicon being, whether it be you or merely an 
uploaded copy of you, could be conscious. 
 4. The hard problem of AI consciousness 
 When we deliberate, hear music, see the rich hues of a sunset, and so on, there 
is information processing going on in the brain. But above and beyond the 
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manipulation of data, there is a subjective side – there is a felt quality to our 
experience. Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness asks: why does all this 
information processing in the human brain, under certain conditions, have a felt 
quality to it? Why aren’t we “zombies” in the philosopher’s sense, being creatures 
that lack inner experience ( Chalmers 2008 )? 
 As Chalmers emphasizes, this problem doesn’t seem to have a scientiﬁ c answer. 
For instance, we could develop a complete theory of vision, understanding all of 
the details of visual processing in the brain, but still not understand why there are 
subjective experiences attached to these informational states. Chalmers contrasts 
the hard problem with what he calls “easy problems”, problems involving con-
sciousness that have eventual scientiﬁ c answers, such as the mechanisms behind 
attention and how we categorize and react to stimuli ( Chalmers 2008 ). Of course 
these scientiﬁ c problem are difﬁ cult problems; Chalmers merely calls them “easy 
problems” to contrast them with the “hard problem” of consciousness, which he 
thinks will not have a purely scientiﬁ c solution. 
 We now face yet another perplexing issue involving consciousness – a kind of 
“hard problem” concerning machine consciousness, if you will: 
The Hard Problem of AI Consciousness: Would the processing of a 
silicon-based superintelligent system feel a certain way, from the inside? 
 A sophisticated AI could solve problems that even the brightest humans are una-
ble to solve, but still, being made of a different substrate, would its information 
processing feel a certain way from the inside ( Chalmers 2008 ;  Searle 1980 ;  Sch-
neider 2015 )? 
 This is not just Chalmers’s hard problem applied to the case of AI. For the hard 
problem of consciousness assumes that we are conscious – after all, each of us can 
tell from introspecting that we are conscious at this moment. It asks  why we are 
conscious. Why does all your information processing feel a certain way from the 
inside? In contrast, the Hard Problem of AI Consciousness asks  whether AI, being 
silicon-based, is even capable of consciousness. It does not presuppose that AI is 
conscious. These are different problems, but they are both hard problems in their 
own right – problems that science alone cannot answer. 
 Ned Block has raised a similar problem, which he calls “The Harder Problem 
of Consciousness” ( Block 2002 ;  McLaughlin 2003 ). In essence, Block focuses 
on the case of a “superﬁ cial functional isomorph” (SFI) of a human – a being 
“that is functionally isomorphic to us with respect to those causal relations among 
mental states, inputs, and outputs that are speciﬁ ed by ‘folk psychology’ ” ( Block 
2002 , 399). According to Block, a SFI need not be conscious, because for all we 
know, the capacity for consciousness may depend upon a system’s underlying 
substrate, and a silicon-based functional isomorph may lack the right substrate 
( Block 2002 ). Block aptly calls attention to the epistemic difﬁ culty of determining 
whether a different realization would be conscious. 
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 Is our problem just Block’s “Harder Problem of Consciousness” then? Block 
develops his line of thought by focusing on a case of a SFI. In contrast, our hard 
problem of AI consciousness applies to systems that are not reasonably consid-
ered functional duplicates of us, by either armchair folk psychological attribu-
tions or scientiﬁ c functionalist assessments (i.e., psychofunctionalism). It applies 
to systems that are incredibly different from us with respect to their cognitive 
and perceptual capacities, such as superintelligences or AGIs not designed to be 
humanlike. Further, Block’s problem arises only for proponents of what he calls 
“Phenomenal Realism,” a view that counts among its commitments that no “a 
priori or at least armchair analyses of consciousness (or at least armchair sufﬁ -
cient conditions) are given in non-phenomenal terms, most prominently in terms 
of representation, thought or function.” In contrast, our problem can be raised 
while being neutral about the ultimate status of such analyses. For all we know, 
there is some as yet unforeseen but correct armchair analysis of consciousness in 
terms of information processing functions. We are nonetheless currently in the 
position to be deeply perplexed about  whether an AI performing such functions 
would thereby be conscious. 
 The problem is more general than Block’s problem then: simply put, silicon 
may not be the right medium for consciousness. 
 Our problem is also related to biological naturalism, a position that is com-
monly associated with John Searle that has historically denied that AI can be 
conscious (see  Searle 1980 ). But unlike Searle, we do not ﬁ nd the Chinese Room 
thought experiment compelling (see  Schneider 2015 and Mandik 2017 for discus-
sion). 4 We do not wish to  deny that machines can be conscious. Instead, we con-
sider it an  open question whether silicon-based beings can be conscious. 
 We gain a better understanding of the hard problem of AI consciousness by 
asking: what considerations may be fueling this problem? Perhaps the problem 
is fueled, at least in part, by a kind of other minds problem, applied to the case 
of machines. The case of machines is certainly more challenging, because in the 
human case, we feel others are minded because of their behavior as well as the 
fact that they have a physiology that is similar to ours. The case with machines is 
more challenging, because of a lack of physiological similarity, and it gets quite 
difﬁ cult if a machine’s cognitive and perceptual systems are not even loosely 
similar to our own, as we may not even have similar behaviors to go on. 
 An other-minds problem, on its own, may fuel the problem, but it does not 
strike us as being a compelling reason to deny consciousness to AGIs or SAIs. 
Ethical considerations suggest that it is best to be charitable in these cases, for any 
mistake could wrongly inﬂ uence the debate over whether such creatures might 
be worthy of special ethical consideration as sentient beings. As Asimov’s robot 
stories illustrated, any failure to be charitable to AI could come back to haunt us, 
as they may treat us as we treated them. Indeed, AIs could pose a “hard problem 
of carbon-based consciousness” about us, asking if biological, carbon-based enti-
ties have the right substrate for experience. After all, how could AI ever be certain 
that we are conscious? 
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 The Problem of Other Minds is not the only concern that fuels the Hard Prob-
lem of AI Consciousness, however. 5 A further, related concern is the following. 
Carbon molecules form stronger, more stable chemical bonds than silicon, which 
allows carbon to form an extraordinary number of compounds, and, unlike sili-
con, carbon has the capacity to more easily form double-bonds. This difference 
has important implications in the ﬁ eld of astrobiology, because it is for this reason 
that carbon, and not silicon, is said to be well-suited for the development of life 
throughout the universe ( Bennett and Shostak 2012 ). If these chemical differences 
impact life itself, we should not rule out the possibility that these chemical differ-
ences also impact whether silicon gives rise to consciousness, even if they do not 
hinder silicon’s ability to process information in a superior manner. This is not an 
endorsement of biological naturalism, but is a consideration indicating that it is 
not yet clear whether AI can be conscious. 
 If the answer to the AI hard problem is that silicon cannot be the basis for 
consciousness, then superintelligent machines – machines that may even one day 
supplant us – will exhibit a vastly superior form of intelligence, but they will 
lack inner experience. Just as the breathtaking android in the movie  Ex Machina 
(2015) convinced Caleb that she was in love with him, so too, a clever AI may 
convincingly behave as if it is conscious. 
 Further, if subsequent reﬂ ection on the AI hard problem reveals that even beings 
with artiﬁ cial brains that are computationally like those of humans cannot be con-
scious, then, in an extreme, horrifying case, humans upload, and only nonhuman 
animals are left to feel the spark of insight, the pangs of grief, or the warm hues of 
a sunrise. This would be an unfathomable loss, one that is not offset by a mere net 
gain in intelligence. Even the slightest chance that this could happen should give 
us reason to proceed in the development of uploading and brain implant technolo-
gies with caution. These issues urgently need to be addressed. 
 4.1 A solution? 
 Is there a means to answer the AI Hard Problem? Two scenarios are suggestive. 
 First, although it is unlikely, we could ﬁ nd silicon-based  natural intelligence 
on a planet – silicon-based life that arose through chemical processes, rather than 
being constructed by a biological species. If these creatures have a phenomeno-
logical vocabulary – a vocabulary of what it is like to experience the world – it 
would not be due to their being programmed by a biological species to act as 
if they had experience. Further, their phenomenological vocabulary cannot be a 
mere mimicry of the behavior or vocabulary of a biological species that evolved 
separately and had contact with them. What we need is pure, untainted silicon 
phenomenology, if you will. 
 If untainted naturally occurring silicon-based phenomenology was discov-
ered, this would make more plausible the claim that artiﬁ cial silicon-based 
systems could support phenomenology. Of course, even in this case some may 
still doubt whether artiﬁ cial systems could be conscious (based, for instance, on 
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considerations about teleofunction or John Searle’s alleged derived/non-derived 
intentionality distinction) (cite). 
 Let’s turn now to a second suggestion for making progress on the Hard Problem 
of AI Consciousness. Let us return to the case of one’s migration to the cloud. In 
the process of migrating, neurons that form the neural basis of one’s conscious-
ness are gradually replaced by silicon chips. If, during this process, a prosthetic 
part of the brain ceases to function normally – speciﬁ cally, if it ceases to give rise 
to the aspect of consciousness that that brain area is responsible for – then there 
should be behavioral indications, including verbal reports. An otherwise normal 
person should be able to detect, or at least indicate to others through odd behav-
iors, that something is amiss, as with traumatic brain injuries involving the loss of 
consciousness in some domain, such as blindsight or blindness denial. This would 
indicate a “substitution failure” of the artiﬁ cial part for the original component. 
 But should we really draw the conclusion, from a substitution failure, that the 
underlying cause is that silicon cannot be a neural correlate of conscious experi-
ence? Why not instead conclude that scientists failed to program in a key feature 
of the original component – a problem which science can eventually solve? But 
after years and years of trying, we may reasonably question whether silicon is 
a suitable substitute for carbon when it comes to consciousness. This would be 
a sign that the answer to the hard problem of AI consciousness is negative: AI 
cannot be conscious. But even a longstanding substitution failure would not be 
deﬁ nitive , for there is always the chance that our science has fallen short. But this 
scenario would provide some evidence for a negative answer. 
 Readers familiar with Chalmers’s “absent qualia, dancing qualia” thought 
experiment may object that we’ve missed something, for Chalmers’s thought 
experiment supports the view that consciousness supervenes on functional con-
ﬁ guration: if you ﬁ x the psychofunctional facts, you ﬁ x the qualia. But we are 
disputing that functional isomorphism occurs in the ﬁ rst place. We consider it an 
open question. 
 If silicon systems cannot be conscious, then the functional facts cannot be 
ﬁ xed. When it comes to consciousness, carbon and silicon are not functionally 
interchangeable. For why would a silicon system, S2, be a psychofunctional iso-
morph of the original system, S1, after the transfer? S2s replaced brain region, or 
minicolumn, being made of silicon, will always differ causally from the replaced 
component. For wouldn’t the new silicon component somehow signal to other 
brain areas that there is a defect in consciousness, as with neurophysiological 
deﬁ cits? 
 Could the silicon chip be doctored, so as to signal consciousness when con-
sciousness was absent though? This is a tricky question. It could be the case that 
there are some observational false positives, in which case, we may fail to rule out 
certain cases of non-conscious systems. But would it then be a genuine functional 
isomorph of a carbon system? It is not clear that it would be, for the brain chip 
would need to prevent signaling to other brain areas that consciousness is lacking. 
AuQ10
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The conscious system would not. Our example does not require rejecting the view 
that qualia supervenes on functional organization, then. 
 Conclusion 
 The practical and intellectual challenges we foresee philosophers of mind help-
ing to meet have here fallen into four groups. The ﬁ rst group of challenges cen-
tered on the possibility of superintelligent artiﬁ cial intelligence, a technology that 
may potentially populate our world with nonhuman selves bestowed with capaci-
ties that meet or exceed our own. The second group of challenges concern brain 
enhancement, extreme cases of which might result in beings more posthuman 
than human. Even more extreme transformations formed the core of the third 
group of challenges, those that centered on the hypothetical technology of mind 
uploading, which might constitute a way for human minds to survive indeﬁ nitely 
through digital backup, or might instead be merely a very expensive form of sui-
cide. Fourth and ﬁ nally, we raised the hard problem of AI consciousness, a special 
form of the problem of determining whether a given entity is such that there’s 
something it feels like to itself “from the inside.” There’s an ethical element to this 
problem, for we recognize an ethical imperative not to inﬂ ict avoidable suffering 
upon any being, whether they be natural or artiﬁ cial. 
 We surely have just scratched the surface in exploring ways that philosophy of 
mind can help shape the future. Despite the numerous ways that will surely escape 
our foresight, we are conﬁ dent that the technological changes that await us, in 
particular those involving information processing technology, will pose problems 
that science alone cannot equip society to solve. 
 Notes 
 1  Further, there is growing concern among policymakers and the public that AI will even-
tually outmode humans, leading to technological unemployment (Frey and Osborne, 
2013). 
 2  DeepMind is a British artiﬁ cial intelligence company acquired by Google in 2014. 
The IBM’s  Watson program is a natural-language processing computer system that 
famously competed on  Jeopardy! in 2011. 
 3  Worries about technological unemployment do not assume that AGIs will be superin-
telligent; indeed, people can become unemployed due to the development of domain-
speciﬁ c AI systems that are not even at the level of being AGIs. 
 4  In Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument, Searle appeals to the thought experiment 
of the “Chinese Room” to argue against the possibility of artiﬁ cial systems being genu-
inely intelligent. In the thought experiment, Searle runs a program for understanding 
Chinese despite himself understanding only English. Observers outside of the Chinese 
room send and receive messages to and from the room that lead them to believe the 
room’s inhabitant is perfectly conversant in Chinese. But Searle is orchestrating the 
message exchange solely in virtue of following instructions written in English. 
 5  For discussion of the Chinese Room Thought experiment, see (Schneider 2015 and 
Mandik 2017). 
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